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Emperor of his nation, in fact - when, tragically for them both,
their relationship fell apart. She became so disenchanted with him
that she called Dr. G for help. Now, you might be wondering why
she would need a doctor to help with her marital woes. This was
about 2,000 years ago, so she didn't ask him for Valium or
Prozac. She didn't need him to testify as to her husband's abusive
nature at their divorce hearing. No, she called her doctor because
he had scientific expertise in using herbs and chemicals. She
needed his help to poison her husband, who was the Emperor
Claudius (Tacitus, The Annals Book XIV, 1-16). And, apparently
like many a good doctor of the time, he obliged his client.
Margaret Mead, the anthropologist, observed that the
followers of Hippocrates seem to have been the first to separate
the roles of healer and sorcerer (Bulger and Barbato, 2000). Most
Greek physicians didn't follow the Hippocratic dicta, either
before or for many years after Hippocrates' time. Agrippina tried
to murder Claudius with her doctor's assistance 400 years after
Hippocrates probably lived, and many Greek doctors assisted in
suicides and acted in other ways contrary to the proposed
standards of the Hippocratics, who were a distinct minority sect.
As the medical historian Albert Jonsen has put it: In Ancient
Greece, "there does not seem to have been anything like a
medical profession" (Jonsen, 2000, p9).
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Even the Hippocratics themselves seem to have
recognized their minority status. They did not aim to establish
shared standards of practice for all physicians. Their Oath is
focused on individual, not collective, promises, starting with the
phrase, "I swear by the Gods, that I will. .. " The Oath might even
be seen as a marketing tactic, a set of public promises made to
bring more patients into the unique Hippocratic franchise.
And, as the story of Aggripina shows, the Hippocratics did not
succeed in professionalizing Greek medicine. Yet, what they
undeniably did was lay the foundation for the eventual
development of medical professionalism, by combining the
scientific and moral aspects of medical practice and making them
explicit. In fact, specific details of their beliefs about medical
knowledge, wisdom, and service were all addressed in the
Hippocratic texts.
For example, in addition to specific teachings about how
to treat a condition, they also urged humility in practice and the
importance of learning from mistakes. The famous Hippocratic
aphorism, "life is short, the art long, opportunity fleeting,
experiment treacherous, judgement difficult," demonstrates their
recognition of the high-risk nature of medical practice
(Hippocrates, Aphorismi, part 1). In fact, the Greek word
"experimentum," generally translated as "experiment," actually
referred to any treatment regimen given to a patient, further
3
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suggesting their recognition of the inherent dangers of medical
practice. They also write that "describing a mistake with all its
consequences makes it avoidable" (Michler, 1977), presaging
modem-day concerns for patient safety and quality improvement.
In the moral realm, they promised not to intentionally
harm patients, to protect patients' privacy, and to share what they
learned with each other, thus laying the groundwork for a
collegial community with shared standards for moral behavior.
They also seem to have recognized the interplay between
the scientific and moral bases of their work. Patients won't share
information if they fear breaches of privacy. Medical practice
will improve if practitioners share what they learn with each
other, rather than holding new methods secret.
But it would take 2000 years for the full meaning and
promise of this necessary interplay between science, ethics, and
the service-oriented goals of medicine to come to fruition as
medical professionalism. Throughout the Middle Ages, for
example, little new learning took place in medicine. Religion
then taught that illness was a punishment from God, over which
men had little control, and the medical culture was oriented
around a reverence for the ancients, such as Galen and his
teachings about "humours" (Geraghty and Wynia, 2000). The
aim of medical training in this time was simply to memorize what
the ancients had to pass down. Even basic investigations to better
4
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understand human anatomy, for example, were vigorously
discouraged. There is some irony in the fact that the Hippocratic
texts, which were revered, urged humble scientific investigation
and learning while religious beliefs, combined with an outsized
reverence for ancient learning, prevented physicians from
heeding this advice for more than l,OOOyears. It wasn't until the
Renaissance and Enlightenment eras that medicine would
re-emerge as a scientific and ethical, rather than ideological and
religious, enterprise (Geraghty and Wynia, 2000a).
England's John Gregory, who was heavily influenced by
Scottish enlightenment thinkers and the methods of Bacon ian
science, proposed a uniform ethic to govern medical practice in
the mid-1700s. While he saw humility, which he called
"diffidence," as a core personal virtue - it was a key part of his
"ethics of character" - he also began to see what he called "our
art" as entailing shared service to humanity (Gregory, 1772). This
shared service included moral duties that applied to all physicians
- and resembled those of the Hippocratics, such as the obligation
to acknowledge errors, learn, and share new information with
other practitioners.
This notion that all physicians have a moral obligation to
conduct scientific inquiries, to learn and improve, took root
among many leading physicians of the 1700s, though it was
usually framed as a matter of individual virtue rather than as part
5
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of an explicit social contract. American physicians like Thomas
Bard told students their whole lives would be "one continued
series of applications and improvements," and they would be
responsible even for their "errors of ignorance," unless they had
"embraced every opportunity for obtaining knowledge" (Bard,
1769).
Benjamin Rush, was a leading physician at the time ofthe
American revolution, who signed the Declaration of
Independence, and who formed the fIrst incorporated hospital in
the United States with Benjamin Franklin, urged his students to
"open all the dead bodies you can [and] record the epidemics of
every season ... Record the name, age, and occupation of your
patient; describe his disease accurately, and the changes produced
in it by your remedies; mention the doses of every medicine you
administer to him ... " (Rush, 1815). He thought great progress in
human happiness would arise if physicians were to collect these
data and share their knowledge with each other to improve
medical practice. As a side note, George Carlin once said, "Isn't
it unnerving that doctors call what they do, 'practice'?" Which is
funny, but the word 'practice' is, in fact, appropriate. It reflects
this ancient notion that we are always learning - always
practicing and always aiming to improve.
Another English physician, Thomas Percival, fIrst coined
the terms "medical ethics" and "professional ethics" in the late
6
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1700s (percival, 1803). He even went on to articulate a practical
rationale for shared ethical responsibilities for all doctors. His
work was grounded in the fact that hospitals demanded teamwork
in a way that independent practice had not. His own hospital, the
Manchester Infirmary, had been riven by feuds, some leading to
duels, between competing doctors. As a result, he argued for a
professional collegial culture of respect and sharing, including
with non-physician members of the team. He urged the keeping
of a clinical register with data on every patient admitted to the
Infirmary, and for team rounds during which "the junior
physician present should deliver his opinion first, and the others
in the progressive order of their seniority" (Percival, 1803, ppl9-
21), a model of shared care, information transfer, and teaching
that persists to this day on hospital rounds.
But Percival was stymied when he tried to take this model
nationwide in England. The British medical establishment saw a
shared code of ethics as unnecessary, because English doctors
were gentlemen and already knew how to behave.
Acknowledging the need for a code would be an affront to their
presumed dignity and virtue. In fact, some saw a code as frankly
undesirable, because - as the historian of medical ethics Bob
Baker has put it - they thought a written code would be "useful
only to persons who, lacking decent character, wish to pretend
that they had one" (Baker et aI, 1999).
7
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American medicine, however, was ripe for development
and adoption of an explicit, shared code of medical ethics. Like
England, the United States was suffering from similar medical
chaos at the time, with multiple competing ideologies of medical
practice - Thomsponians, Ecclectics, Homeopaths - no
standardized medical training curriculum, and widely disparate
values among practitioners, many of whom were blatantly
commercial in their medical work. American medicine also
suffered from internecine warfare among competing
practitioners, including pamphlet wars and even duels.
But unlike in England, American physicians were not
fully steeped in the presumptions of class-based virtue, honor and
privilege. They were more attuned to ideals of social mobility,
free contracts between equals, and to the French enlightenment
idea of social contracts as governing relations within
communities. After some state and local efforts, especially in
Baltimore and New York, an explicit social contract for the
United States medical profession was first published as the
American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics, at the
founding of the AMA in 1847.
It is worth reflecting on this for a moment. Codes of
ethics have since become common; every profession or wanna-be
profession has one now. But the AMA's Code was the first code
of ethics adopted nationally by any profession, anywhere. It was
8
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widely hailed as revolutionary then, only a little over 150 years
ago. Commentators at the time thought it "the most important
public document since the Declaration of Independence" (Baker
et aI, 1999)
It was revolutionary because it made an explicit,
combined and integrated set of promises from doctors to their
patients, their colleagues and their communities with regard to
their scientific, ethical and service orientation. It promised that
all physicians were to undergo training in "scientific medicine,"
to promote "scientific logical medicine," and be "conservators of
the public health" (Baker et aI, 1999). They would also all
promise to protect patient confidences, seek to use the best and
most effective treatments, maintain a sense of humility in
practice, share information with each other, continue providing
care during epidemics, and so on.
Philosophically, the Code was based in easily understood
moral notions of reciprocity, with society, physicians and
individual patients all receiving explicit benefits and having
explicit reciprocal obligations. The Code thus followed in the
great tradition of Bard, Percival, Gregory, and the Hippocratics,
but it made these promises clear, and it made them as a collective
- as a profession. In sum, the Code created the formal profession
of medicine and, equally important, it made an implicit argument
9
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for professionalism as a way to organize and deliver medical
care.
Definitions
Before moving on, I should be clear about my use of these
terms - and especially what "professionalism" means.
Professionalism is derived, at its root, from the word "profess,"
which means to speak out or declare, with obvious connotations
of making a public promise. At a wedding, the bride and groom
profess their love and commitment, and a professor is someone
who 'speaks out' on a subject.
A "profession," then, is a group of people who speak out
and publicly declare, together, something about the shared values
and standards that govern their work. Note that while a professor
is a single person, a profession is always a group - because it
implies a group professing something, together, about the aims,
methods, competencies, and so on entailed in doing their work.
So a professor works as a member of the teaching profession, a
lawyer as a member of the legal profession, and so on. Note also
that professions must be further specified by reference to the
work under discussion - the legal profession, the engineering
profession, or the medical profession.
A "professional," then, is an individual member of the
profession. But "professional" can also be used as an adjective -
10
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an action can be professional or unprofessional, for example -
and in that case, a professional action is one that is in accordance
with the professed standards and values of the group.
Unprofessional actions are those that contradict the shared
standards or values of the group.
So what is professionalism? Professionalism, like
other-isms, is an ideology about how best to structure and deliver
particular social goods. Communism, capitalism, libertarianism,
consumerism, Protestantism, Catholicism - all of these are
ideologies about some important aspect of social functions and
relations. The ideology of professionalism is that developing and
maintaining a profession is the best way to deliver and protect a
specific social good. That is, those who promote professionalism
argue for the value of creating a group of people, professed
experts in some field of work, who are willing and able to come
together to determine and declare the standards and values that
they promise will govern their work, and then entrusting that
group - the profession - with a specific scope of work that is
important to society. Professionalism, as an ideology, promotes a
desired social role for the professions, as groups that establish,
promote, and enforce shared standards for work that is important
in society.
Like the professions, professionalism must be specified to
a type of work - medical professionalism is not the same as legal
11
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professionalism, for instance, because the groups do different
work, operate in different social structures, and have made
different sets of social promises. As a result, there can be a better
or worse case for some types of professionalism compared with
others, because some socially important work almost requires the
development of a profession, while other work does not.
In medicine, we have more or less successfully made the
argument that medical care is best delivered by entrusting it to
medical professionals, members of social groups who have made
shared promises about their competence, ethics, and a particular
service orientation. The arguments for professionalism in
medicine often focus on the inherent challenges facing patients,
who may be ill, fearful, or even unconscious.
1'In not going to put forward a complete argument for
professionalism at the moment; instead, let me just say that there
are alternatives to professionalism as ways of organizing and
delivering medical care. The sociologist Eliot Friedson called
professionalism "The Third Logic" because it contrasted with
two other major methods of organizing and delivering social
goods. One is the marketplace, in which various vendors with
varying quality goods and services compete with each other;
trade secrets are the norm; and caveat emptor (buyer beware) is
the motto (Friedson, 2001). This method is promoted by the
ideologies of libertarianism and consumerism, both of which are
12
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antithetical to professionalism because they eschew the
restrictions on individual liberty that are inherent in making
group promises. I'll come back to this in a moment.
The second major method is to use an external bureaucratic
mechanism, usually the state, to organize and deliver medical
care. In this model, standards of practice are established by civil
servants, presumably acting on behalf of society and individual
consumers, and these practice standards are then enforced by
those outside the group of practitioners. Note that this model
arises from a distrust of both the market and of practitioners. It is
most popular where individual consumers cannot look out for
their own interests (in areas like environmental standards,
national defense, or other shared social good like roads and
bridges, where caveat emptor just doesn't make sense) and where
practitioners cannot be trusted to act in the public's good and
therefore need close monitoring.
Medical professionalism posits that individual patients
cannot always act to protect their best interests - so caveat
emptor won't work as a ruling principle for health care - but also
that medical care is impossibly complex and difficult to regulate
for state bureaucrats. Therefore, advocates of medical
professionalism argue, it is best to empower professionals to act
together to protect the best interests of patients and the public.
That is, rather than leaving health care to the vagaries of the
13
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XIX No.2
market, or the strictures of government regulation, health care
should be entrusted to health care professionals.
This assertion can be challenged, of course. In closing,
I'm going to address briefly two core challenges to
professionalism. First, can we really trust health professionals to
keep their promises? Second, if we can trust the profession, then
what are the core promises we expect medical professionals to
uphold?
Can We Trust Doctors?
There is no easy answer to the first question, about trust.
After all, there are a lot of health professionals out there, so no
system of organizing and delivering medical care will be
perfectly trustworthy 100% of the time. But even to approach an
answer I think we need to be much more explicit about what we
mean, within and outside the profession, when we talk about
trusting doctors by empowering them with "professional
autonomy."
There are two very different understandings of
professional autonomy in circulation today, and they reflect a
debate within the profession that has been going on since at least
1847, but that is rarely made explicit. I'd like to make this debate
explicit because it is critical to understanding the job of health
professional education. Namely, does "professional autonomy"
14
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mean the right of each individual medical practitioner to choose
their own modes of practice, methods of treatment, and so on?
Or does it mean the right of the professional group to establish-
and to enforce - its shared standards for group members? And
note that these are opposing ideas, so it cannot mean both at the
same time.
The fIrst version of professional autonomy really equates
it with personal liberty: the right of individual doctors to practice
as they wish. But that is the very opposite of what Ihave asserted
that professionalism really promotes, which is the activity of a
group coming together to establish and enforce its practice
standards.
To put this very bluntly, the core question is: To what
extent did Igive up my own personal liberty when Ibecame a
physician and, implicitly or explicitly, agreed to live up to the
shared promises of my chosen profession? When Iput on a white
coat, draped a stethoscope around my neck, and put an MD after
my name, what was Iconveying to my patients and the public
about the standards and values that would govern my interactions
with them? When Icompleted medical school, was Iready to live
up to those shared promises, even if they might sometimes
conflict with my personal preferences?
These are important questions, in part because our
profession, as a group, has accomplished a number of important
15
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tasks, many of which benefit individual practitioners and, we
hope, patients too. Licensure requirements effectively preclude
non-professionals from providing certain dangerous medical
services. We have attained important social privileges, like the
right to help our patients get out of work, or get a refund on an
airline ticket. But these prerogatives of being a doctor were only
accomplished because our profession made a set of promises both
to society at large and to our individual patients. Are medical
school graduates today ready, willing, and able to live up to those
promises? Do they even know what our shared promises are?
Before speaking to what these promises are, let me say
that these questions are at the heart of health professional
training. Medical students need to understand how these promises
come about, what organizations are involved, and how they work.
They need to understand the degree to which different standards
are binding or are mere recommendations, and they need to
accept their professional responsibility to be involved in ongoing
deliberations about the standards and values that govern medical
practice. If they disagree with a standard, or think our shared
professional values are off-track, it is not enough simply to
ignore the standard or subvert the value with which they disagree.
We work as a profession, together, or the profession doesn't work
at all.
16
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The second core question, then, is what are the standards
that we all should aspire to uphold? I have argued that being a
health professional means making a set of shared promises, and
now I'd like to specify that at the heart of medical
professionalism is a set of promises about three basic things:
medical knowledge, wisdom, and purpose.
First, medical professionals promise to acquire, maintain,
and advance the scientific and technical skills necessary for
competent medical practice. This promise with regard to medical
knowledge is obvious and requires little defense (unless one is
unfamiliar with professional practice standards or not in
agreement with them, at which point questions and disagreements
about professional enforcement of practice standards arise).
Second, as regards wisdom, we promise to acquire,
maintain and improve the interpersonal skills necessary to work
with patients to elicit goals and values that can help direct the use
of our medical knowledge and skills. This is sometimes referred
to as the "art" of medicine, and it is what promotes the wise use
of our scientific and technical skills. For example, a technically
correct solution to a medical problem, but one that won't be
accepted by the patient, is the wrong answer. To pursue it might
not reflect a deficiency of medical knowledge, but it would be
ineffective and hence unwise.
17
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Some might argue that this promise about the wise use of
our technical skills and knowledge, guided by our patients'
values, preferences, and goals, is a new professional promise,
since physicians sometimes have developed a reputation for
being poor communicators, ignoring patient input, being brusque,
and so on. But in fact, this is an ancient obligation that was, I
believe, temporarily set aside as the era of scientific medicine
arose. For almost a century, some in medicine have acted as
though because we could cure patients, we didn't need to be
attentive to their values and goals. With great medical success
came increasing paternalism and the waning (if not the
obliteration) of the humility in practice that Hippocrates,
Percival, and others had long promoted. But that doesn't mean
this promise isn't critical and doesn't need to be revived,
especially in an era of increasing chronic disease and the need for
patients to manage their own care over long periods of time at
home.
Even in the time of Plato, it was recognized that a good
physician communicates well with patients and enlists them in
making treatment decisions. In Plato's Laws, Book 4, he writes:
[The Athenian asks] ... did you ever observe that there are
two classes of patients in states, slaves and freemen; and
the slave doctors run about and cure the slaves, or wait for
them in the clinic. They never talk to their patients
individually, nor do they allow them to talk about their
own individual complaints. The slave doctor diagnoses
18
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and prescribes a remedy on an empirical basis, [but does
SO] as if he had exact knowledge; He gives his orders [to
the patient], like a tyrant, and then rushes off, to see some
other slave who is ill, all the while projecting an air of
confidence and assurance.
But the other doctor ... attends and practices upon
freemen; and he carries his enquiries [with his patient] far
back, and goes into the nature of the disorder in a
scientific way; he enters into discourse with the patient
and with his family, and is at once getting useful
information from the sick person, and also instructing him
as far as he is able. [The physician] will not prescribe for
the patient until he has first convinced him; at last, when
he has brought the patient more and more under his
persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he
attempts to effect a cure.
Now which is the better way of proceeding in a physician
and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his
ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and
that the ruder and inferior?
Finally, our third set of promises, which is equally
important, encompasses the larger purposes, or service, to which
we put our knowledge and our wisdom. Namely, we promise to
acquire, maintain and advance our professional values, which
hold above all that medical professionals will use their medical
knowledge and skills always in the service of patients and the
public's health.
One might call this the "triple promise" of
professionalism - because these three core professional promises
about our technical knowledge and skills, our interpersonal
19
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knowledge and skills, and the values that will govern how we use
these skills, all tie together to ensure the trustworthiness of the
medical profession.
The Role of Organizations in Supporting Professionalism
Finally, with more time, we might delve into more details
on each of these three promises and what it might take to ensure
that all health professionals understand and live up to them, but
I'd like to close instead with a brief comment on how
professionalism and health care delivery organizations interact to
facilitate, or to hinder, the ability of health professionals to live
up to these promises.
The systemic and organizational milieus in which health
professionals work can make it much easier, or much harder, to
do the right thing. My belief is that we, as a profession, have a
responsibility to help develop systems and organizations that
support professional actions. As the AMA has framed this, we
need to work together to make it easier for doctors to "promote
the art and science of medicine and the betterment of public
health." While it is fair to measure whether physicians are
providing high quality care - and the AMA is playing a central
role in this process by developing clinical performance measure
through the PCPI, the Physicians' Consortium for Performance
Improvement (www.ama-assn.org/go/pcpi) - the AMA has also
20
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argued that it is fair to ask, and to measure, whether the
organizations and systems in which physicians work are
providing an environment that makes it easy to do the right thing
(www.ethicalforce.org).
For example, we know that effective communication is
necessary for informed consent and patient engagement in their
care - and research shows that ineffective communication
disproportionately affects racial and ethnic minorities, the poor,
those with lower literacy, and those who don't speak English well
(Ethical Force Program, 2006). In other words, ineffective
communication is widely recognized as a key driver of health and
health care disparities. Racial and ethnic inequities in care have
been recognized, by the AMA and others, as a moral blight on
our profession, and we know that improved communication
might help.
One response to this problem is to improve how we train
physicians. Clear communication skills are teachable; specific
methods like "teach-back" are effective at ensuring patients
understand, and they have even been correlated with improved
clinical outcomes (Weiss, 2007). But what do we do about
systemic and organizational barriers to effective communication?
A well-trained clinician in an organization that doesn't have
effective interpreter services is hamstrung. Mistrust in health care
organizations is more common among minorities, and is
21
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associated with reduced adherence and increased disparities, but
individual clinicians are limited in their ability to engage local
communities to improve trust in the medical profession.
Organizational leaders are responsible for creating a practice
climate that supports effective communication and care for
diverse patients. Organizational culture affects job performance,
but individual clinicians working alone can't change an
organization's culture.
Our recent work has been to develop a method for
organizations to measure their communication climate - using a
set of tools we call the C-CAT, or Communication Climate
Assessment Toolkit (www.ama-assn.org/go/ccat). We've shown
that organizations' scores on the C-CAT are correlated with
patients' perceptions of the quality of care they are getting, and
with patients' trust in health care (Wynia et aI, 2010).
Given the increasing complexity of the care we deliver,
and the importance of addressing quality improvement in
systemic ways, Ihope that the future will bring even more tools
to measure whether organizations are making it easier, or harder,
for doctors to do the right thing. By creating tools to measure and
improve the ethical climate of health care organizations, we hope
to build the promises of professionalism into the very fabric of
health care delivery organizations.
22
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